PROCEEDINGS AT HEARING OF APRIL 7, 2021

COMMISSIONER AUSTIN F. CULLEN

INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS		
Witness	Description	Page
	Proceedings commenced at 9:30 a.m.	1
Douglas LePard (for the commission)	Examination by Mr. Davis	2
(101 the commission)	Proceedings adjourned at 10:51 a.m.	64
	Proceedings reconvened at 10:55 a.m.	64
Douglas LePard	Examination by Ms. Harlingten	65
(for the commission)	Examination by Ms. French	72
	Examination by Ms. Tweedie	78
	Examination by Mr. Rauch-Davis	85
	Proceedings adjourned at 11:27 a.m.	90
	INDEX OF EXHIBITS FOR IDENTIFICATION	
Letter Description	on	Page

No exhibits for identification marked.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS			
No.	Description	Page	
802	Curriculum vitae of Doug LePard	3	
803	Review of the Joint Illegal Gaming Investigation Team (JIGIT) - Doug LePard, Catherine Tait - November 2020	6	
804	Draft Proposal for a Provincial Financial Integrity/Crime Unit - January 22, 2018	53	
805	Final Draft - Concept Paper Designated Provincial Financial Crimes Unit - February 15, 2019	54	

806	CFSEU-BC Proposal for Proceeds of Crime/Asset Forfeiture Team - December 2018 (redacted)	54
	(ii)	

1	April 7, 2021
2	(Via Videoconference)
3	(PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT 9:30 A.M.)
4	THE REGISTRAR: Good morning. The hearing is now
5	resumed. Mr. Commissioner.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Yes,
7	Mr. Davis.
8	MR. DAVIS: Yes, Mr. Commissioner. The next witness
9	will be Mr. Doug LePard. Before we proceed with
10	Mr. LePard's oath and evidence I wanted to
11	signal to the Commissioner and participants that
12	today has the potential to run long. After will
13	LePard we have a second set of witnesses, two
14	representatives from the JIGIT team of the RCMP.
15	I'm in your hands, Mr. Commissioner, but I hope
16	today that we'll finish by ideally about 2:30 or
17	3:00 Pacific time, at the latest.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: That's fine as far as I'm
19	concerned, Mr. Davis. And if there's any
20	difficulty with any of the participants, they
21	are certainly free to speak up.
22	DOUGLAS LEPARD, a
23	witness for the
24	commission, affirmed.
25	THE REGISTRAR: Please state your full name and spell

- 1 your first name and last name for the record.
- 2 THE WITNESS: Douglas Alan LePard. My first name is
- 3 spelled D-o-u-g-l-a-s. I go by Doug. And the
- 4 last name is L-e-P-a-r-d.
- 5 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.
- 6 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Davis.
- 7 MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
- 8 EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVIS:
- 9 Q Mr. LePard, can you see and hear me okay?
- 10 A Yes, I can.
- 11 Q I'm going to start off with some questions about
- 12 your background and current role.
- MR. DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if you could please
- 14 bring up the document titled "CV Doug LePard"
- from the list of documents, please.
- 16 Q Mr. LePard, please let me know when you're able
- to see that document on the screen.
- 18 A I can see it now.
- 19 Q And do you recognize that as an up-to-date copy
- 20 of your CV with the -- note the redactions at
- 21 the top, but this is your CV?
- 22 A Yes.
- 23 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Commissioner, if I could ask this
- please be marked as exhibit number 802.
- THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, very well. 802.

1	THE	REGISTRAR: Exhibit 802.
2		EXHIBIT 802: Curriculum vitae of Doug LePard
3	MR.	DAVIS:
4	Q	Mr. LePard, looking at your résumé, since 2018
5		you've worked as a policing and criminal justice
6		consultant at your consulting firm Doug LePard
7		Consulting; is that right?
8	А	Yes.
9	Q	And what sorts of services do you offer in your
10		consulting business?
11	А	A variety of services to police organizations
12		and law firms around policy analysis, research,
13		investigations on occasion. Done an
14		investigation for the BC legislature into a
15		matter there. Have provided advice to law firms
16		on various matters and have conducted research
17		projects like this one in looking basically
18		doing an operational review of JIGIT. I worked
19		with Peter German on Dirty Money - Part 2 and
20		was responsible for the horse racing and luxury
21		vehicles chapters of that report. Those are
22		examples.
23	Q	And before your work as a consultant,
24		Mr. LePard, you held the role of Chief of the
25		Metro Vancouver transit police, a role that you

Q

1 held from 2016 until 2018. Do I have that 2 right? 3 Α Yes. 4 Q And prior to that role you were a member of the 5 Vancouver Police Department from 1981 until 2016; is that correct? 6 7 Α Correct. 8 And you acted as the Deputy Chief of the VPD from August 2003 until March 2016 commanding the 9 10 investigation division. Do I have that correct? 11 During that time I was first commanding the Α 12 investigation division and then I moved to the 13 operations division. 14 And for your policing work and your 0 15 contributions to the criminal law, Mr. LePard, 16 you've received a number of awards. And I'm not 17 going to through all of them, but I'll provide 18 you with a short list here and ask you to 19 confirm it. To name just a few of those awards 20 you've received, the first is the gold medal 2.1 from the International Society For the Reform of 22 Criminal Law. You've received that award; 23 correct? 2.4 Α Yes.

You've also received the Queen Elizabeth II

1 Diamond Jubilee Medal; is that correct? 2 Α Yes. 3 And you are an Officer of the Order of Merit for 4 the police forces from an award that you received from the Governor General of Canada; is 5 that correct? 6 7 Α Correct. 8 And, Mr. LePard, in terms of education you hold a Master of Arts in Criminal Justice from the 9 University of the Fraser Valley? 10 11 Yes. Α 12 And you hold a Bachelor of Arts from Simon 0 13 Fraser University; is that correct? 14 Α Correct. 15 MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Madam Registrar, I won't need 16 that document displayed for the time being. 17 Thank you. 18 Mr. Commissioner, I'm getting a note that my 19 internet connection is unstable. Are you able 20 to hear me okay? 21 THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry. I'm having no difficulty 22 at all, Mr. Davis. 23 MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. 2.4 Mr. LePard, carrying on. You were retained in Q

2020 by the Government of British Columbia to

1 conduct a review of the Joint Illegal Gaming 2 Investigation Team, JIGIT, of CFSEU. Is that 3 correct? 4 Α Yes. 5 MR. DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if I could ask that you please pull up the document titled GPEB5699 with 6 7 redactions from the list of documents, please. 8 And, Mr. LePard, do you recognize this as a copy of that review with the date you can see here on 9 the front of November 2020? 10 11 Yes. Α 12 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Commissioner, if I could ask that 13 this please be marked as exhibit number 803. 14 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, very well. 803. THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 803. 15 16 EXHIBIT 803: Review of the Joint Illegal Gaming 17 Investigation Team (JIGIT) - Doug LePard, Catherine Tait - November 2020 18 19 MR. DAVIS: 20 0 You conducted this review with Ms. Catherine 21 Tait; is that correct, Mr. LePard? 22 Α Correct. 23 And who Ms. Tait? 0 2.4 She's another consultant who was hired by the Α

provincial government to work with me on this

1		and supported by several staff in police
2		services, and she had previous experience on a
3		related matter in that she had written a report
4		about the IIGET team which was disbanded in
5		2009.
6	Q	And on these reports, Mr. LePard, what is the
7		purpose of an operational review?
8	A	Well, it's really to look at the operation and
9		see whether it is functioning well, whether
10		there are improvements that could be made in
11		terms of improving its capacity or its
12		efficiency or its operations.
13	Q	And what was the purpose of this review then,
14		Mr. LePard?
15	A	Well, as I understand it in its delegation
16		letter when JIGIT was created back in 2016 that
17		their part of their mandate was that after
18		four years that there would be a review. So it
19		had always been planned that there had been a
20		review to see if the funding ought to continue.
21	MR.	DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if you could scroll to
22		the bottom of page 34 of the PDF, please.
23	Q	Do you see here the heading "Objectives" and
24		there's a sentence below with two bullets,

Mr. LePard?

1	А	Yes.
2	Q	The first sentence under "Objectives" reads:
3		"The ToR"
4		Is that terms of reference?
5	А	Terms of reference, yes.
6	Q	Thank you.
7		"The ToR set out that the review would
8		undertake an examination of both outputs
9		and outcomes."
10		What can you tell the Mr. Commissioner about
11		what are outputs and what are outcomes? What
12		are the differences between them?
13	А	The outputs is more measures of activities. So
14		measures of internal performance, for example,
15		the number of investigations, the number of
16		enforcement activities against illegal gaming,
17		numbers of arrests, numbers of charges. Those
18		are the outputs.
19		Outcomes are farther down the road. What is
20		the benefit to society. It can include things
21		or it's influenced by things that are not
22		necessarily under control of the police unit
23		involved because there are other players, for
24		example, the courts and sentencing and Crown
25		prosecutors and so on that the outcome is what's

1		the level of interruption and disruption of a
2		criminal organization, if that's the goal of the
3		JIGIT team in this case.
4	Q	And both outcomes and outputs are metrics that
5		you or not metrics but terms that you explore
6		in this report?
7	А	Yes.
8	Q	And what methodology did you employ when you
9		conducted this review, Mr. LePard? What was
10		your what was your plan of attack?
11	А	It was broad. We wanted to look from as many
12		different angles as we could, and so we first
13		started with looking at all the related
14		documentation. There was a lot of
15		correspondence leading up to the creation of the
16		team and the other relevant documents. We
17		engaged in database mining to get actual police
18		statistics. We looked at what the program costs
19		were, so how much was government investing in
20		the JIGIT program, and then what was the
21		cost-benefit analysis. And not in the same way
22		that you would look at the cost-benefit analysis
23		of a business. Policing is not about producing
24		a profit but looking at what we call a social
25		return on investment. What is the downstream

Α

1 benefits of the activities of JIGIT. 2 So we looked at that. We conducted over 40 interviews. We looked at their human 3 4 resource issues. We looked at the environmental 5 state. So there was a variety of techniques that we used to try to get the big picture and 6 7 the full picture. 8 And that term "social return on investment" is Q something that we'll return to later in your 9 10 examination. But I wanted to clarify for now, 11 Mr. LePard, that the study period for this 12 report is 2016 through 2019 inclusive; is that 13 correct? 14 Α Correct. 15 MR. DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if you go to page 37 of 16 the PDF, please. Towards the bottom half there's a paragraph -- yes -- "Limitation of 17 18 Methodology/Findings." 19 Do you see that, Mr. LePard? Q 20 Α Yes. 21 I'm not asking to you to read from the report Q 22 per se, but can you summarize the limitations 23 that you had, data or otherwise, in conducting 2.4 this report?

Well, a big limitation when we're looking at for

1		example, the impact and the value of that impact
2		is that the amount of money laundering is one of
3		those big unknowns. I mean, the estimates of
4		that range so widely that it's hard to know, you
5		know, what the figure is that you're actually
6		dealing with. And then narrowing that down to
7		the amount that's occurring in a gaming
8		facility.
9		The other thing is is that there's always
10		some bias when you're interviewing people who
11		have an interest in it. And not that anybody
12		was attempting to mislead us or anything like
13		that, but naturally the members of JIGIT who we
14		interviewed were proud of their work, they were
15		very passionate about it, but that does
16		introduce a bias. And so we mitigated that by
17		interviewing as broadly as we could not just
18		JIGIT members but other stakeholders.
19	Q	And before we go into the results of the review,
20		are there any typographical or other areas that
21		you'd like to bring to the Commissioner's
22		attention in the report?
23	А	Well, to make a long story short, the report was
24		actually the I submitted it in July. There
25		was a problem. No one's fault. Everybody was

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Correct.

1		trying to do their best, but there were three
2		different executive directors that I was working
3		with in police services, so there was some
4		different people influencing the report that had
5		different ideas and that resulted in some
6		editing problems and some version control.
7		So by the time it was finalized in
8		November there were a number of minor errors,
9		but the two significant ones that I would bring
10		that were errors is in the conclusion. There's
11		an appendix X mentioned. That appendix has been
12		removed, so you won't find it in the report.
13		And in the conclusion as well it refers to
14		several times to a chart. That chart has
15		actually still exists, but it was moved to the
16		front of the report to page 18. The rest of the
17		errors are minor editing errors that occurred
18		during the different versions that were being
19		worked on.
20	Q	So beyond minor editing errors, just to
21		summarize, then, it's the absence of appendix X
22		which is mentioned in the conclusion as well as
23		a chart that is on a different page than it's
24		referenced. Is that a fair summary?

1	Q	Okay. And, Mr. LePard, now I'd like to discuss
2		the results of the review starting with what you
3		learned about JIGIT and its mandate more
4		generally. Mr. LePard, to begin what's your
5		understanding based on the work you did on this
6		report of the mandate of JIGIT?
7	A	Well, the basic mandate was to have a unit that
8		could investigate illegal gaming activities,
9		whether they were occurring inside or outside
10		casinos and interrupt organized crime, interrupt
11		and suppress organized crime.
12	Q	And in your review how well does JIGIT balance
13		that mandate of looking into legal and illegal
14		gaming venues?
15	A	Well, they had quite a few cases of illegal
16		gaming outside of casinos, so I think there were
17		about 30 files open into illegal gaming outside
18		casinos and also a number of files inside
19		casinos. How well they accomplished their
20		mandate, I think that they first of all they
21		worked very hard. That was clear. They had a
22		lot of cases. They had one very significant
23		case that unfortunately is still at the charge
24		approval process and so we don't know the
25		outcome of that, but they were successful in a

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1 number of other investigations.

And when I say successful that isn't just about getting arrests and charges; it's about successfully interrupting or suppressing criminal activities. Seizing their assets is an important way that they do that. So when they're targeting and disrupting organized crime, there are a number of ways that they do that, including criminal investigations.

And also a key part of their mandate -because arrests and charges are not necessarily the most efficient way and sometimes they're the most inefficient way to try to deal with a problem, so JIGIT recognized that from early on and it was always part of their mandate to try and look farther upstream in terms of education and prevention activities, improving coordination and collaboration between stakeholders to try to reduce the amount of criminal activity that was occurring in the first place and narrow the funnel so that there's a limited number of cases that are left that the best way to deal with it is with the police.

So they engaged in all of those aspects in

1		terms of prevention and education and
2		suppression, disruption and also criminal
3		charges.
4	Q	You referred to a major investigation in your
5		answer there. Is that E-Nationalize, the large
6		investigation that resulted in I think nine
7		persons arrested?
8	А	Yeah, I was wondering if we were going to be
9		able to say the word because I see it's redacted
10		from the redacted version of the report. But
11		yes, E-Nationalize.
12	Q	Hearing no objection, you can confirm that it is
13		E-Nationalize, that large investigation?
14	А	Yes.
15	MR. D	PAVIS: Madam Registrar, if you could please turn
16		to page 53 of the PDF, please. There's a
17		paragraph that begins with "The JIGIT Mandate"
18		on the second half of the page there.
19	Q	Mr. LePard, right under this heading in bold
20		there I'm going to read to you, you've written:
21		"In the years since inception, JIGIT has
22		delivered on key portions of its mandate
23		as outlined in the business case submitted
24		with less of an impact on illegal gaming
25		houses linked to organized crime."

1		Do you see that there in bold?
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	So what can you tell the Commissioner about that
4		finding? What made you so conclude in the
5		report?
6	А	Sorry, we're looking at the bottom paragraph on
7		page 52 now?
8	Q	Sorry, no, we're on page 53 of the PDF. That is
9		page 52 of the report.
10	А	Yeah.
11	Q	There's under the "The JIGIT Mandate" in bold
12		there's a short paragraph there and it starts
13		with "the finding."
14		"In the years since inception, JIGIT has
15		delivered on key portions of its mandate
16		as outlined in the business case
17		submitted, with less of an impact on
18		illegal games houses linked to organized
19		crime."
20		And this stems from my earlier question about
21		balancing those two kinds of competing
22		investigative avenues, and I'm asking what's
23		made you conclude that they have had less of an
24		impact on illegal gaming houses?
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A Well, the information was a little bit

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1	contradictory, but they opened about 30 files on
2	illegal gaming houses and only a minority of
3	those files were actually associated to
4	organized crime. Some of them were they were
5	illegal in that they were operating, but they
6	weren't necessarily associated to organized
7	crime. But having said that, the ones where
8	they undertook the most significant
9	investigative steps, obtaining a search warrant,
10	executing a search warrant and so on, where they
11	did the most work was in 11 files that were
12	associated to organized crime.
13	So they may not have been successful as they
14	wanted to be in terms of focusing on illegal
15	gaming houses because that was their mandate was
16	to focus on those ones that were being run by
17	organized crime and they actually investigated a
18	number that were not being run by organized
19	crime but were illegal nonetheless. And so that
20	is why we came to that finding.
21	Q Mr. LePard, maybe we can unpack a little bit.
22	MR. DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if you could go to
23	page 51 of the PDF. I'm going to begin by
24	asking you below in the paragraph below this
25	table here, Mr. LePard, do you see that? The

1		paragraph that starts with "currently"?
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	So it reads:
4		"Currently, JIGIT is comprised of 26 staff
5		positions, made up of 14 police officers,
6		7 GPEB members and 7 civilians (analysts,
7		administration, disclosure) either
8		employed or contracted to OCABC."
9		Is that the Organized Crime Agency of BC?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	So do you recall, Mr. LePard, the date on which
12		these staffing metrics were accurate? Is this
13		2019 or 2020? When was this?
14	A	That was a paragraph describing the current
15		state so that was in early 2020.
16	Q	Okay. And how, in your view, does this staffing
17		composition and the and you know, the 26
18		staff position, how do those deal or how do
19		those measure up to deal with complicated money
20		laundering investigations?
21	А	Well, every police unit will tell you that they
22		would benefit from having more resources and
23		that was certainly we heard that loud and
24		clear from JIGIT members is that, you know, to
25		be optimally successful they needed more

1		resources. And that may very well be true and
2		there's a couple of specific issues that I did
3		write about in the report where they would
4		benefit from more resources and specifically
5		around their surveillance capacity.
6		But one of the problems that JIGIT also
7		suffered from which is not necessarily uncommon
8		in specialized units is that they carried
9		vacancies quite regularly, and so that
10		exacerbated the sense that members had that they
11		didn't have enough members. Well, when you have
12		three to five vacancies typically, then it's
13		going to feel like you don't have enough members
14		because they didn't even have their actual
15		authorized allotment for much of the time that
16		they were operating.
17	Q	Did you have any insight into how that you
18		know, how that was reflected in terms of
19		expertise and capacity within the unit, these
20		staffing and turnover issues?
21	А	Well, it just makes it very difficult because if
22		you don't have that continuity, you're always
23		onboarding new members and they have to get up
24		to speed and be developed and they're being
25		trained as they're working. And so like I say,

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Mr. Davis

1		this is not unique to JIGIT. It's just one of
2		the realities of policing where you have members
3		coming in and out.
4		The attrition in JIGIT, just based on my
5		experience, did seem to be quite high but also
6		they're mostly RCMP members and of course the
7		RCMP have so many and varied demands on them as,
8		you know, municipal, provincial and federal
9		policing that it didn't surprise me to see that.
10		I note in the RCMP's own report, for example,
11		describing the proposal for the FIIU, it talks
12		about the 30 percent vacancy in federal
13		positions and so on.
14		So it just makes it is more difficult to
15		function well when you've got that sort of
16		turnover. At one point we were told, I believe,
17		that only three when we were doing the review
18		that only three of the original members from
19		2016 were still in the unit. So that's quite a
20		bit of turnover and it just makes it more
21		challenging because, like I say, you're
22		constantly bringing people up to speed, getting
23		them the training they need. They're learning
24		on the fly essentially.
25	Q	When you say resources, are you referring only

1 to sworn officers or other resources as well? 2 Α Well, I would be referring to the other resources if we'd heard that. We didn't hear 3 4 that that was a challenge, for example, with 5 support staff or with the GPEB members. We heard that that was a problem with -- basically 6 7 at the constable and corporal level with the 8 RCMP positions. And looking at some of the enforcement 9 Q statistics here, Mr. LePard, you've touched on 10 11 this a bit, but I thought I'd ask you. Compared 12 to other measures, for example, if we consider 13 regulatory measures, where do you think that a 14 police response to money laundering should be 15 and kind of where should it be in the priority 16 chain? Should it be the first response? Should 17 it be considered after regulatory measures? 18 What's your view on that question? 19 Really it doesn't just apply to this issue. I Α 20 mean, it really should be the last line of 2.1 defence. I mean, if war is a failure of 22 diplomacy, crime is a failure to a great extent 23 of policy. And, you know, policing is not 2.4 necessarily the best response except where 25 police can be very influential and effective in

1		prevention because investigating is complicated
2		and expensive and the results are uncertain.
3		And even when they are successful, the nature of
4		the crime may be that the sentences don't
5		provide necessarily deterrent or incapacitation
6		of the offenders.
7		So that's why police recognize that it's far
8		better to look upstream and engage in prevention
9		activities and police have an important role in
10		that, but so do many others. And so around
11		policy and legislation and regulation,
12		cooperation between businesses and government
13		and so on, far better to prevent than to try to
14		investigate or to use investigation as the way
15		to address a problem.
16	Q	The term you just used "going upstream," that
17		refers to reliance on, for example, regulatory
18		or policy as opposed to investigative measures?
19	А	Absolutely.
20	Q	And what can you tell the Commissioner about
21		examples of going upstream? Have you seen any
22		in your time in policing of this working in
23		practice?
24	А	Oh, of course. I mean, police I mean, what

people see that's public is, you know, the

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arrests and police officers out there in

uniform, but all police agencies are engaged

in -- to some extent in prevention activities.

And I know -- and I can speak for my own police

departments that I've worked in for my whole

career -- I saw good prevention activities.

And if I think right back to the 1980s when we had a problem with drug-fuelled spontaneous stabbings in bars in the Downtown Eastside and the police department pursued amendments to the Liquor Control and Licensing Act to prevent people from bringing knifes and/or weapons into bars and those regulations or amendments were passed and that had a measurable impact.

I could give many other examples of police agencies engaging in prevention by looking farther upstream, either seeking legislative change or proactive investigations to focus farther upstream or even -- for example, in about 2008 we started focusing on great concerns we had about violent incidents involving the mentally ill both as victims and perpetrators and did a lot of advocacy work to look for better resources to assist the mentally ill.

And one of those outcomes was assertive

1		community treatment teams and assertive outreach
2		teams, the idea being to get resources to those
3		mentally ill people most likely to come in
4		conflict with the law and to reduce that.
5		And there's a study on the Department of
6		Justice website showing the impact of that with
7		criminals looking when we are dealing with
8		gang murders, for example, to look upstream, use
9		really good information and analysis from our
10		excellent crime analysts about who is most
11		likely to engage in a shooting and then target
12		them for less than murder but still serious
13		offences and try and incapacitate them so
14		they're not going to engage in shootings. So
15		that is an example of targeted police
16		investigations that looks upstream.
17	Q	And in your view, Mr. LePard, would this
18		going upstream, would that apply equally to
19		financial crime as it does stabbings or roadside
20		prohibitions or anything else?
21	А	Even more so. Even more so because so much can
22		be accomplished by regulation and cooperation
23		and appropriate information sharing between
24		business and government and police where
25		appropriate to reduce the impact.

1		And, you know, there have been international
2		reports that have pointed out where there have
3		been effective anti-money laundering regimes,
4		and Canada unfortunately has not been one of
5		those countries that has been pointed out for an
6		effective money laundering regime. In fact some
7		of the headlines from the New York Times or the
8		Wall Street Journal or C.D. Howe Institute, none
9		of them have been very flattering about Canada's
10		essentially a haven for money laundering as
11		opposed to the UK and Australia and the United
12		States.
13	Q	Mr. LePard, kind of removing ourselves from the
14		upstream questions and looking at this table
15		we've got still helpfully here on page 51, are
16		you able to see that table there, Mr. LePard?
17	А	Yes.
18	Q	What does this table show? Can you explain that
19		to the Commissioner.
20	А	Yes. What we did is we went to both the RCMP
21		and the Vancouver Police Department and asked
22		them to extract files from PRIME, which is the
23		Provincial Records Information Management
24		Environment, so the common records management
25		system that all police in British Columbia use,

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and look for files in the study period that were
associated with money laundering and illegal
gaming. And the combination of the files
located by the RCMP and the VPD was 66 and about
half of them were illegal gaming houses.

And so the first thing I should say is that

And so the first thing I should say is that that is a very small number of files and really requires some explanation. And so just to digress just a little bit, I mean, there's what's called a dark figure in crime and in some crimes like murder, for example, the dark figure is very small because most murders become known to the police. Most break and enters of residences become known to the police because people report them for various reasons.

There are other criminal offences who are much less likely to become known to the police because they don't necessarily have a direct victim who's going to report it, and we can see other examples of that. For example, impaired driving. Those numbers are really mostly a product of the level of police informant -- police enforcement, sorry. The same with drug offences. I mean, we joke that if you want to eliminate drug crime simply stop enforcing it;

1	the numbers will go to zero. Of course it will
2	still exist. It's just the dark figure that
3	will get larger.
4	So these types of offences that are
5	displayed in this table, you know, are
6	relatively small numbers. We know that the
7	issue of money laundering is much larger than
8	that, but the reporting of it is very low. The
9	detection of it is very low and the only way
10	that we can see the size of the problem is to
11	have more in-depth analysis and really to have
12	adequate enforcement in place.
13	If we look at a country or, you know, if we
14	look at the United Kingdom, it's less than twice
15	the population of Canada. They have 2,000
16	criminal cases a year and about 1,400
17	convictions a year compared to Canada where
18	2016, so over 16 years, I think there were 314
19	or 318 convictions. So about 20 a year. So I

tools and we don't have the enforcement regime
that's detecting the level of money laundering

don't think that it's because we're doing so

well here with money laundering that no one has

decided to do it here. It's we don't have the

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25 that other information suggests is significant.

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1 And I suppose that ties back to your earlier 2 evidence about going upstream and information 3 sharing, that those are avenues that might help 4 with that detection problem. Is that a fair 5 statement? Yes. 6 Α MR. DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if we could please turn 7 8 to page 97 of the PDF. At the very bottom, 9 please, there should be a number of bullet 10 points down there. That's perfect. 11 Do you see that, Mr. LePard, there at the 0 12 bottom, the two bullets, "27 investigations/ 13 files, 34 arrests"? 14 Α Yes. 15 So we can see here, Mr. LePard, that in the 2016 16 to 2019 period you've described that JIGIT 17 undertook 27 investigations that resulted in 18 34 arrests. Am I reading this correctly? 19 Α Yes. 20 And of all of those cases there have been no 21 charges yet laid for money laundering; is that 22 right? 23 Α Correct.

MR. DAVIS: And if we go, Madam Registrar, to page 99

of the PDF, please. And it's at the very bottom

1		just above the footnotes.
2	Q	Mr. LePard, this is a bit hard to read with the
3		redactions, but I'll read you this last sentence
4		on the page just above the footnotes. It says:
5		"In addition to [redacted] JIGIT has
6		conducted at least 26 shorter
7		investigations, some of which are still
8		underway."
9		Is that correct? Do you remember writing that?
10	А	Yes.
11	Q	And so what's your view on JIGIT handling these
12		sorts of smaller files versus larger, more
13		complex, higher dollar value files? Is that a
14		function of what's available to it or is it a
15		function of capacity?
16	А	Well, both of those things. But when it comes
17		to these smaller files, first of all I would say
18		it's a relative term. Even the small files that
19		they investigated, there's a fair degree of
20		complexity in proving the offence and gathering
21		the evidence for them. It involves
22		surveillance, obtaining and executing search
23		warrants, interviewing. You know, they're not
24		like a simple, you know, arresting someone for
25		breaking into a car. They are relatively

1	complex. Obviously nowhere near as complex as
2	the major investigation we discussed.
3	But I would make a couple of other points.
4	First of all, it is part of their mandate to
5	investigate illegal gaming operations and there
6	are a couple of reasons for that. Because
7	sometimes they are run by organized crime.
8	Secondly, they create a revenue stream for
9	organized crime and criminals generally that
10	then has to probably be laundered somewhere, and
11	so that is an issue.
12	And a very significant thing and we heard
13	loud and clear from police of jurisdiction when
14	we interviewed them was that these illegal
15	gaming operations, they breed other kinds of
16	crime, whether it's loan-sharking, assaults,
17	robbery, disruption, disorder in communities.
18	And so they were extremely appreciative of
19	JIGIT's work in responding promptly and
20	effectively and coming and assisting or taking
21	over and dealing with illegal gaming operations.
22	So there is great value in that in terms of the
23	value to the community, the magnifying effect of
24	working with the police of jurisdiction in
25	dealing with issues that they don't have the

1		capacity or the expertise to deal with.
2		And the other thing is is that those
3		investigations you know, no one starts as
4		you know, on their fist day as an investigator
5		and saying, here is a complicated murder for you
6		to solve. I mean, they start with smaller
7		investigations and it's that variety of
8		investigations that police officers conduct that
9		they build the skills so that they can take on
10		the more significant ones. And so there is
11		value for the members of JIGIT themselves in
12		conducting these relatively smaller
13		investigations in terms of building their
14		skills.
15	Q	And, Mr. LePard, when you through the course
16		of conducting your review and your interviews,
17		did you ever get a sense of what one of these
18		illegal games houses look like for the
19		Commissioner and the public? What level of
20		sophistication? What's going on at those
21		illegal gaming houses?
22	А	Yeah, well, one of their more significant ones
23		was occurring in a mansion on the west side of
24		Vancouver and was quite a sophisticated
25		operation in which they had professional gaming

1		equipment and so on. So some of them are
2		smaller. They're occurring in you know, they
3		might be occurring in a house, in a residence or
4		in a back room somewhere. So they really
5		varied, but they can be quite significant.
6		And although it wasn't a JIGIT
7		investigation, just as an example of how
8		significant these can be, there was an
9		investigation conducted by FSOC in which the
10		total revenue of the illegal gaming house in
11		four months was over \$60 million and over
12		30 million of that was net profit for the gaming
13		house. So
14	Q	Sorry, across four months? Four months?
15	А	In four months. So again I want to be clear.
16		That wasn't one of JIGIT's investigations, but
17		it does show the potential for these operations
18		in terms of criminal organized crime creating a
19		revenue stream for them, requiring laundering of
20		course, the other crimes that it breeds, the
21		revenue stream that is created that can be
22		re-invested in crime.
23		So these operations can be quite
24		significant. Run by organized crime. And also

to be fair there are some that they are run

25

1		really because they are providing a service to
2		people who don't want to go to a casino or
3		because they want to play games that aren't
4		being offered in the casino. And so they are
5		illegal, but they aren't necessarily being run
6		by organized crime.
7	Q	Do you have any insight, and I why would
8		someone beyond wanting to play different
9		games, why would they choose an illegal gaming
10		house? Did you ever get any insight into that
11		during your time in policing or during this
12		review?
13	А	Well, I can just say from my general knowledge
14		that they might not want to be in a casino
15		because they have been banned, because they
16		don't want to be under that sort of
17		surveillance, because they think that they may
18		be targeted or, you know, some criminals some
19		people just like to live an outlaw lifestyle and
20		would prefer why do people buy marijuana from
21		an illegal source now when they can buy it from
22		a legal source. Well, some people just choose
23		to do that.
24	MR.	DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if we could turn to

page 139 of the PDF, please. One three nine.

1		There's a table in the middle of the page. Oh,
2		yours is in colour that's even better.
3	Q	Mr. LePard, are you able to see that table on
4		the middle of the page there?
5	А	Yes.
6	Q	What can you tell the Commissioner about this
7		table? It relates, I think, to what you were
8		just describing the profitability of illegal
9		gaming venues.
10	А	Right. Well, this is taking various examples
11		and looking at how much money is going through
12		them and then looking at well, if we stop that,
13		you know, how much interruption has there been
14		in terms of money being re-invested into crime,
15		because that's what happens with criminal
16		proceeds is it's used to further other crimes.
17		And so if a small gaming operation is producing
18		\$140,000 a year, which by the way is untaxed
19		revenue, so it's not only being taken away from
20		a legal gaming facility which produces some good
21		in terms of the money that can go to government
22		for good purposes, but it's also being untaxed.
23		And it's also just an estimate that the effect
24		of removing that operation, the downstream

impact is over half a million dollars.

1	Q	And then we see here looking, for example, the
2		lower bound estimate for a year of successful
3		operation is \$40,000. That's significantly
4		lower than the FSOC file you described, isn't
5		it?
6	А	Yeah, they're not even comparable.
7	Q	Magnitudes lower. Is that fair to say?
8	А	Yes.
9	Q	So is there do you have a sense of how
10		these like, is there a significant variance
11		in the size, structure, sophistication of these
12		illegal games houses?
13	А	Yes. Like I say, some of them it appears that
14		they're almost like mom and pop operations,
15		quite a small operation, and then you have your
16		mid-level ones. Like the one that was, I
17		believe, in a warehouse in East Vancouver and
18		then the same operator was operating out of a
19		mansion in the west side of Vancouver, a
20		multi-million dollar operation. So I would say
21		that's a mid level. And then you've got these
22		very sophisticated operations that are moving
23		tens of millions of dollars through them which
24		is creating this huge revenue stream for
25		organized crime which can then be re-invested in

1		crime and whether that's into buying opioids for
2		trafficking or whatever that is that the
3		criminal organization is involved in.
4	MR.	DAVIS: And on the issue of metrics related to
5		illegal gaming houses, Madam Registrar, if you
6		could go to page 56 of the PDF, please, at the
7		bottom.
8	Q	There's a paragraph there that says "discussion
9		and recommendations" at the very bottom. Do you
10		see that, Mr. LePard?
11	А	Yeah.
12	Q	I'm going to read a small portion of this to
13		you. It says:
14		"Despite the concerns about the value of
15		illegal gaming house investigation, JIGIT
16		members may be too focused on sentences
17		received by operators of illegal gaming
18		houses rather than other outcomes that are
19		also important, although less easily
20		measured."
21		What can you tell the Commissioner about what
22		you've written there?
23	А	Well, there was a fair amount of disappointment
24		from the JIGIT members about the outcome of
25		their successful gaming house investigations in

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terms of the sentences. And so they found that demoralizing and I think were quite focused on, you know, what is the point of putting all these resources into these investigations, which, like I say, are still relatively considerable and a lot of effort, and then they were disappointed to see a one-day sentence or probation and that sort of thing. And what I've written about in there is that, you know, I understand that. I understand when you're an operational police officer and you want the sentence to be somewhat commensurate with the level of effort that went into it.

But as we all know that's really not the issue. An investigation can be resource intensive and not necessarily result in a significant sentence. But as I wrote in the report, there are other benefits which I mentioned earlier in terms of the service that they're providing to the communities that those gaming houses were operating in. The service to the police department in terms of assisting them. The crimes that are generated by gaming houses, by the very existence of the gaming house in terms of, like I say, the potential for

1 assaults, shootings.

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You know, one police agency that we spoke to, you know, were extremely pleased with the work JIGIT had done and said, look, we've seen a real reduction in those sorts of incidents associated to gaming houses because of their work.

So there's also a deterrent effect and there's the issue, when people are able to flout the law and it becomes known that there's not going to be enforcement, then it breeds further flouting of the law and a disrespect for the criminal justice system and a lack of faith and confidence by the public. And so I know from a municipal policing point of view -- that's why when we spoke to officers in charge or -chiefs, people at a high level in municipal police departments, RCMP detachments, they're very concerned about the public seeing the police as being responsive and being capable of dealing with problems that affect neighbourhoods.

And so the point was -- you know, my point in writing this in terms of JIGIT members reading it is don't be so hard on yourself,

1		you're actually having more impact that than
2		you're really thinking through and don't be so
3		focused on what you consider an inadequate
4		sentence. The sentence is probably the least
5		important. The fact that they shut the
6		operation down, seized their property, made a
7		referral to the Civil Forfeiture Office, got
8		charges against the person, those are all
9		significant wins in my mind.
10	Q	And what can you tell the Commissioner, then,
11		about another method, the social return on
12		investment method that you describe in your
13		report?
14	А	Right. So, you know, I think most people
15		understand return on investment. I mean, a
16		business invests in new equipment for
17		automation. It makes them more efficient. They
18		can reduce their labour force, their profits go
19		up. That's pretty simple. Social return on
20		investment is different. Police and, you know,
21		government services, they're not in the business
22		generally of making a profit. And there are
23		other ways that you have to measure the impact.
24		So social return on investment is
25		essentially a framework for measuring and

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accounting for these broader concepts of value

which might include reducing inequality,

negative impacts on the environment by looking

at the social, environmental and economic costs

and benefits.

So if I can just give a quick example, I saw on the news last week that the provincial government bought three more Downtown Eastside hotels that they are going to convert to supportive housing. They're not going to make money, I don't think. The rent's not going to cover the mortgage on these very expensive buildings. But in terms of the social return on investment, we know -- the research is clear -- that stable adequate housing is the starting point for marginalized people to be successful.

And so I don't know whether they're going to have an evaluation scheme in place, but if I were designing an evaluation scheme, I would be looking at are there improvements in those people that they brought in from outside and put in housing if there are improvements in their health. Have they had reduced visits to the emergency ward. Have their incidence of conflict with the police been reduced in terms

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of arrests and charges and court appearances.

So a less of a drain on the criminal justice

system. Less of a drain on the ambulance

service. Can they measure improved quality of

life and access to support services that may

be -- for some of them hopefully will result in

reduced drug use and maybe even lead to

employment for some of them.

And then lastly, if we look at what's going on in Strathcona Park in Vancouver, if they can bring those people inside and into housing, what is the value to that community around Strathcona of the reduced distress in the community and reduced petty crime and assaults and threatening behaviour and fires and overdose deaths. All of the things that they've seen in Beacon Hill Park in Victoria as well.

So looking at all those impacts as an example of looking at the social return of investment which could be quite significant and can have a value attached to it might not be, like I say, for the building itself, but for society in general there are many benefits to it. And that's what we are talking about when talking about measuring a social return on

1 investment.

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2 Q Are you aware if there's any other police forces
3 around the country or in BC that use this metric
4 or is this something that's kind of unique to
5 this report and up and coming?

A Well, I think social return on investment is well known. It's used in many different circumstances. I can think of, you know, studies that are done, for example, providing better service to children and women who have been the victims of domestic violence and a significant return on an investment.

In terms of policing, I have seen other studies looking at the impact of policing programs. Generally not done by the police departments themselves. I think that they — that probably will become more common, but it's generally through partnering with academia. In Peel Region, the Peel Region Police partnered with Carlton University and Professor Duxbury did an examination of their school resource officer program and found that the social return on investment was actually \$11 in return for every dollar invested in terms of students who are less likely to be bullied, less likely to be

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1		victims of crime, less likely to commit crimes,
2		more likely to graduate, leading to better
3		employment opportunities. And so Carlton
4		University's examination concluded that the
5		social return on investment was very
6		significant.
7		So I have seen these studies in academia
8		being conducted by academia and external
9		examinations, but I haven't seen them conducted
10		by individual police departments themselves, but
11		I expect with the ever increasing demands or
12		accountability and policing that we will see
13		more of that.
14	Q	Mr. LePard, you applied this social return on
15		investment formula to the statistics from JIGIT
16		in your review; is that correct?
17	А	Yes.
18	MR.	DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if we could scroll to
19		page 137. There's a box in the middle of that
20		page on the PDF, please. If you could centre
21		that. Thank you very much.
22	Q	Mr. LePard, can you explain to the Commissioner
23		what we're seeing with this box here in the
24		middle of the page, please.

Right. So this was -- there are a couple of

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1 different formulas, and I should say that this 2 is one where a bright young analyst named Nick 3 Pauls at police services conducted the analysis 4 for this part of the report and then we co-wrote 5 this portion. But we looked at various measures and this is one which is a formula called POCDI 6 7 which is looking at what the value of the 8 interruption was. So -- I've just forgot. Proceeds of crime disruption index is what 9 that's based on. 10

And essentially what it does is it's used to estimate the total impact of the proceeds of crime action on criminal activity, including the costs that are saved to society. So it estimates that the revenue that would have been available for reinvestment in the criminal enterprise had it not been for successful proceeds of crime action and the downstream impacts of that investment.

And so it's based on research that came out of Australia and New Zealand and they come up with a factor, an estimate, of what that would be. And so what you're seeing in this box here is looking at the total amount of cash seized, just over a million dollars by JIGIT, multiplied

1	by the POCDI multiplier, which comes out of the
2	research, and you get this figure of around
3	\$4.7 million in impact.
4	Q 4.27. Sorry.
5	A Sorry, 4.27. It's very small on my screen here.
6	Q Me too.
7	MR. DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if we could scroll to
8	the next page, please. 138 at the top.
9	Q And, Mr. LePard, what can you tell the
10	Commissioner about what this box shows, please.
11	A Well, it's just showing based on that limited
12	analysis because there is more in terms of
13	assessing the value of JIGIT, but just based on
14	the money seized what it's saying is that for
15	every \$4.19 invested there was a \$1 return.
16	Which doesn't sound very good, but, again,
17	policing is not a business and that's actually
18	consistent with what the research says about the
19	return on investment of money laundering
20	enforcement.
21	And again, though, it's not looking at all
22	the benefits. It's simply looking at the amount
23	of money seized and the estimate of the
24	potential criminal activity disrupted. And as
25	I've described, there's many other benefits to

1		what JIGIT is doing as well.
2	Q	Mr. LePard, I'd like to ask you now some
3		concluding questions about this report.
4	MR.	DAVIS: Madam Registrar, if you could please
5		scroll to page 28 of the PDF, please. Thank
6		you.
7		And Mr. LePard, this is the section of your
8		report that deals with recommendations. And I
9		don't plan to take to you each one on the
10		screen, but I hope I can just ask you about
11		them, if that works.
12	А	Sure.
13	Q	The first recommendation is recommendation
14		number 3. And it's that:
15		"Once the recommendations of the Cullen
16		Commission are known, consideration be
17		given to expanding JIGIT's mandate to
18		other key sectors, if deemed appropriate."
19		What made you make that recommendation?
20	A	Well, first of all, it became clear in speaking
21		to JIGIT members is that they were often
22		receiving information about other forms of money
23		laundering that's occurring in other sectors,
24		but they did not have the mandate nor did they
25		have the capacity to deal with it. And we know

1	from previous reports that have been out there,
2	including one that I was involved in, Dirty
3	Money 2, is that there are some very significant
4	sectors out there that are being subject to
5	money laundering, and there are probably many
6	more because we know criminals, money launderers
7	will go the route of least resistance where they
8	can be most effective and do the best.
9	And so to avoid this what Dr. Peter German
10	called the Whac-A-Mole approach, you know, there
11	needs to be capacity to deal with money
12	laundering across sectors. So it's either
13	expanding the mandate of an existing unit like
14	JIGIT or it's creating new capacity, for
15	example, the FIIU that is one of the
16	recommendations being looked at right now.
17	So that's what that was based on, but we
18	didn't want to recommend prior to knowing what
19	this commission was going to find and recommend,
20	to have a recommendation sitting there that they
21	needed to deal with, we thought was premature.

25 Q And how, Mr. LePard, does that relate to

than in casinos.

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And it was basically just raising the flag that

money laundering is occurring much more broadly

1		recommendation number 4 which serendipitously is
2		on the screen. That recommendation says that:
3		"Consideration be given to expanding
4		provincial police resources to address
5		money laundering outside of the casino
6		sector as part of a broader, multisector
7		approach."
8		Why did you make that recommendation and how
9		does it relate to number 3?
10	А	Well, it relates to number 3 in that, for
11		example, a decision could be made to maintain
12		JIGIT's mandate which there are arguments on
13		both sides of it. I mean, one thing that's
14		different about casinos than many other sectors
15		is it's actually geographically contained. You
16		have a relatively small number of major casinos
17		in the province that have been implicated, at
18		least historically, in money laundering and you
19		know exactly where the activity is. Whereas
20		when you're talking about other sectors, whether
21		it's luxury cars or real estate or other
22		businesses that primarily deal in cash that have
23		vulnerabilities, it makes sense that there be a
24		unit that can cross sectors and go wherever
25		the you know, wherever the intelligence

1		suggests that they can have the greatest impact
2		because criminals certainly go to the sector
3		where they can have the greatest impact.
4		So it would have a broad a unit with a
5		broad mandate and sufficient resources and
6		expertise such as is proposed in the recent
7		proposal for an FIIU, that makes a lot of sense
8	MR. I	AVIS: Thank you. And, Madam Registrar, if you
9		could scroll down one page to page 29, please.
10		There's a that's perfect. Thank you, Madam
11		Registrar.
12	Q	There's a recommendation number 13 there,
13		Mr. LePard, and it reads:
14		"That CFSEU-BC conduct a review of the
15		costs and benefits of contracting,
16		seconding from the BCPS or PPSC"
17		I'll pause there. Is that the BC Prosecution
18		Service and the Public Prosecution Service of
19		Canada?
20	A	Yes.
21	Q	Thank you. I'll continue.
22		" or having on retainer an expert legal
23		advisor for JIGIT and other CFSEU-BC units
24		to support complex investigations."

Why did you make that recommendation?

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1	А	You know, we heard three things loud and clear
2		about what JIGIT needed to be more successful.
3		The first thing I already mentioned was
4		resources. The second thing I mentioned was
5		increased surveillance capacity. And the third
6		thing that they mentioned and we heard it
7		repeatedly was the need for prompt, ongoing
8		legal advice because the investigations are so
9		complex, they know that they are going to be
10		facing incredible scrutiny.
11		You know, their most major case has been in
12		the charge approval process for several years
13		now, which I think speaks to the level of
14		complexity in assessing this. And so there was
15		frustration that if, you know, cases are going
16		to be at risk because they weren't done as
17		perfectly as they need to be, then they need to
18		have that ongoing legal advice.
19		And so we looked at various models that had
20		been in existence, including, for example, the
21		former integrated proceeds of crime units that
22		had PPSC prosecutors actually assigned to them.
23		IMET, the Integrated Market Enforcement Team,
24		currently has a PPS prosecutor assigned to it.
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I know that they did get some contracted legal

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1 advice during their investigation but they 2 really expressed the need to have that going --3 ongoing. 4 And so we looked at different models. 5 mean, you can contract a lawyer or have a lawyer on retainer. You could look to have -- a 6 seconded prosecutor has occurred with IMET and 8 IPOC. Or the one that we actually liked the best and result of consultation with senior 9 10 Crown was what was described as the WorkSafe 11 model in which you have a small pool of expert 12 prosecutors who are in place and whenever a unit 13 like JIGIT would need access to that advice, 14 they could draw on it. And the benefit is is 15 that you have a group of prosecutors, who, just 16 like police officers, like to able to brainstorm 17 and bounce ideas off each other, they remain 18 within their prosecution service but develop 19 that expertise. And it doesn't rely on one 20 person being available 365 days year. You can 2.1 have a small pool available.

And that was one that was supported by senior Crown as the model that he thought would be best for JIGIT considering all the pros and cons of the various models.

- 1 Q Was that senior Crown at the PPSC or the BCPS?
- 2 A The BCPS.
- 3 MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Madam Registrar, I don't need
- 4 that document displayed any longer.
- 5 Q Mr. LePard, in the interests of time is it fair
- 6 to say that the commission provided to you a
- 7 number of proposals that were prepared by the
- 8 RCMP for new financial crime and policing units?
- 9 A Yes.
- 10 Q I don't intend to take you through each of them,
- but what I'm hoping to do is pull them up, have
- 12 you identify and confirm that you've seen them,
- have them marked and then I'll ask you generally
- 14 about your views on those sorts of proposals if
- that works.
- 16 A Sure.
- MR. DAVIS: Madam Registrar, I'm going to ask that
- 18 you first please pull up exhibit 796. For
- 19 participants that's CAN-208 from the list of
- documents, please.
- 21 Q Mr. LePard, have you seen this November 9th,
- 22 2016 proposal for a provincial financial crime
- 23 unit?
- 24 A Yes.
- MR. DAVIS: This is already marked. So, Madam

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1 Registrar, if I could ask that you please pull 2 up CAN-001205 from the list of documents, 3 please. 4 Q. Mr. LePard, do you recognize this as a 2018 5 proposal for a provincial financial integrity/ crime unit? 6 7 Α Yes. 8 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Commissioner, if this could be marked as exhibit 804, please. 9 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, very well. 804. 10 11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 804. 12 EXHIBIT 804: Draft Proposal for a Provincial 13 Financial Integrity/Crime Unit - January 22, 2018 14 15 MR. DAVIS: Madam Registrar, next if I could ask that 16 you please pull up document CAN-001009 from the 17 list of documents, please. 18 Mr. LePard, do you recognize this as a 2019 Q 19 proposal for a designated provincial financial 20 crimes unit? 21 Α Yes. 22 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Commissioner, if that could please be 23 marked as exhibit 805.

THE COMMISSIONER: Very well, 805.

THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 805.

1		EXHIBIT 805: Final Draft - Concept Paper:
2		Designated Provincial Financial Crimes Unit -
3		February 15, 2019
4	MR.	DAVIS: And, Madam Registrar, if you could please
5		pull up CAN-000204 from the list of documents,
6		please.
7	Q	Mr. LePard, do you recognize this undated
8		proceeds of crime asset forfeiture proposal?
9	A	Yes.
10	MR.	DAVIS: If I could ask that be marked as 806, I
11		believe.
12	THE	COMMISSIONER: Yes, very well, 806.
13	THE	REGISTRAR: 806.
14		EXHIBIT 806: CFSEU-BC Proposal for Proceeds of
15		Crime/Asset Forfeiture Team - December 2018
16		(redacted)
17	MR.	DAVIS: Thank you. And, Madam Registrar, lastly,
18		if you could please pull up the already marked
19		inquiry exhibit 59 from the list of documents,
20		please.
21	Q	Mr. LePard, have you reviewed this anti-money
22		laundering designated policing unit discussion?
23	A	Yes.
24	MR.	DAVIS: Thank you, Madam Registrar, I won't need
25		that document displayed any longer.

1 And, Mr. LePard, considering your evidence that Q 2 you reviewed these, perhaps you can give the 3 Commissioner in a general sense your views on 4 the proposals made here and what makes for an effective financial crime unit? 5 Okay. Well, there's some significant 6 Α differences between them. So the first two look 7 8 to be different versions of the same proposal. And they're really the -- they're proposals to 9 replace what we had in British Columbia up until 10 11 2013, which was the RCMP's commercial crime 12 unit. And that was almost a hundred resources 13 in the province, mostly in the Lower Mainland, 14 to deal with major fraud cases. And that unit was shut down in 2013 because 15 16 of other federal policing priorities, but that 17 in my mind was a real loss to policing because 18 they were the ones that developed great expertise in financial crime and frauds. And 19 20 they were a resource to municipal police 2.1 departments and RCMP detachments in terms of 22 major frauds that were beyond our capacity to 23 deal with. And so it was an expert resource to 2.4 take on those long-term investigations. And I 25 think in reading those two proposals and the

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rationale -- which are much more modest than the

original proposals. I think the first one calls

for 25 investigators and the second one calls

for 38 investigators considering that there was

more than double that in terms of investigators

in the original commercial crime section.

And so it just in my mind addresses a real gap in policing that exists right now is that it used to be that we would consider well, if we had a low-level fraud that was affecting an individual, we had the capacity to take that in the financial crime section in the Vancouver Police Department, but a major fraud with a few exceptions, it could go to the commercial crime section.

The gap that we were really concerned about was those cases in the middle that no one was looking at because they didn't have the capacity. And so that capacity is -- was really removed. And my concern is that, you know, post-2013 there was really no one that could take on significant fraud investigations because they just didn't have the capacity. I mean, the Vancouver Police Department currently has a financial crime unit of 11 investigators.

1		So if they get tied up on a significant
2		fraud, that can run out their capacity very
3		quickly. And I know they have in the past.
4		There was a multimillion dollar fraud, a
5		discredited lawyer named Werwick [phonetic],
6		something like that, and a real estate agent he
7		was working with. But that was an extraordinary
8		case. It took years to come to a conclusion and
9		used a lot of resources. So there's always
10		going to be more demand for service than there
11		are resources but I'm pleased to see that the
12		RCMP has made this proposal.
13	Q	And thank you. And, Mr. LePard, I'd like to
14		conclude with some questions about your work
15		with Dr. German. You were tasked by Dr. German
16		for conduct work in the horse racing sector; is
17		that right?
18	А	Yes.
19	Q	And what were you asked to do?
20	А	Basically to do an analysis and see whether
21		there was evidence of money laundering occurring
22		in the horse racing sector.
23	Q	And how did you go about conducting that
24		research?

A I educated myself. I knew very little about

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1		horse racing and money laundering and horse
2		racing, so I did a lot of reading of the
3		literature and previous reports into it and then
4		I interviewed a lot of key stakeholders and
5		formulated an approach that I could look at it
6		from a variety of different angles to see
7		whether it was likely that money laundering was
8		occurring.
9	Q	And what did you conclude?
10	A	In a nutshell that it wasn't. That the industry
11		is really just a shadow of its former self
12		pre-legal casinos when it was really the only
13		game in town and, you know, you had a lot of
14		money being bet on horse racing. You know, I
15		mean, it went from prior to legal casinos it
16		went from, like, \$100 million a year to, like,
17		\$7 million a year so a very, very dramatic
18		decline in betting on live racing.
19		And so, you know, looking at just the size
20		of the bets which average, you know, 2 or \$4 and
21		how much money was bet on an entire racing day
22		and what the opportunities were considering, you
23		know, the maximum bet was \$100 at the wicket and
24		\$1,000 electronically, it just wasn't there.
25		There were many reasons why it just wasn't

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there. There had not been a single case reported. I interviewed detectives from many years previously from when the VPD had a gaming unit and although they had dealt with other kind of offences associated to the racetrack, they'd never even had a report of money laundering going on at the racetrack.

There are other ways that money laundering does occur in horse racing. For example, doping horses and cheating and various schemes and scams at the racetrack. Buying and selling very expensive horses. There are a number of cases where money laundering has occurred through that, for example, through a major drug cartel buying what were described as narco horses.

So there is money laundering going on in the horse racing industry internationally where it is very, very large industry, like in the UK or Australia or Hong Kong, which has an incredible anti-money laundering regime in place to prevent it. Major tracks in the US. But there was not a scintilla of evidence to suggest that money laundering was occurring in horse racing in British Columbia or even that it was realistic for it to be occurring.

1	Q	And you were similarly tasked by Dr. German to
2		conduct work into the luxury vehicle sector; is
3		that right?
4	А	Correct.
5	Q	And how did you go about conducting that
6		research?
7	А	A similar approach. I did a lot of reading to
8		orient myself to what the situation was and
9		looked at investigations into money laundering
10		in other jurisdictions that had been occurring
11		through vehicles. There was really a wealth of
12		information about that. I applied my police
13		experience too in terms of well, how does a
14		criminal with no legal source of income buy an
15		expensive car. Well, they are going to need to
16		buy it with cash because they're not going to be
17		getting bank loans and that sort of thing.
18		So again, to put it in a nutshell, I
19		approached it from a number of different angles.
20		And one of those was to cold call dealerships,
21		sometimes with information that I had received
22		confidentially either through tips that we
23		received when we were working on the project or
24		through police officers who were expert at these
25		kinds of investigations about where I might want

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1		to look, and found it wasn't hard at all to find
2		that there was money laundering going on through
3		luxury cars in a number of different ways,
4		either directly purchasing very expensive cars
5		with the proceeds of crime to engaging in
6		various scams to legitimize proceeds of crime.
7	Q	And, Mr. LePard, in doing that, what material
8		were you able to obtain from the province when
9		you were working on that section of Dirty
10		Money 2?
11	А	Well, one of the areas that we looked into was
12		what is called the grey market in vehicles. And
13		we wanted to it can be a conduit for
14		trade-based money laundering in which various
15		scams, re-invoicing, false invoices are used in
16		sending property overseas. It might be you
17		know, result in a payment with drugs, for
18		example, that is going to be trafficked here.
19		There's just a wealth of information,
20		particularly in cases internationally in the US
21		of how criminal organizations have used the
22		purchase or theft of expensive cars and even
23		used cars as a way to fund criminal operations.
24		So getting back to my point. One of the
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things that we asked the province for was

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provincial sales tax refund data and what we found was that from not many years ago, just in 2013, there had only been about 100 requests for refunds of provincial sales tax on vehicles.

And by I think it was -- the last year we looked at was 2018, that had increased to more than 4,400 times a year that PST refunds had been requested. And the reason that they are being requested is because vehicles had been bought and then exported out in contravention of the purchase agreement.

So I don't know how much detail you want me to go into, but it was a mechanism for sending vehicles, the grey market where they could get a much higher price for them, for example, in China, despite signing a purchase agreement saying it was not for export. And because the law says that if you export the vehicle you can apply to have the PST refunded, it was ending up in the last year that we looked at I think that the province refunded \$85 million to people who clearly were not the actual exporter. They were straw buyers, nominees who had been hired by the actual exporters, the actual beneficial owner of these vehicles who were making huge profits on

1		these vehicles sending them overseas into
2		this you know, a sketchy industry that may
3		support trade-based money laundering requiring
4		the province to greatly increase its resources.
5		So costing all of us taxpayers as they increased
6		their resources to support this sketchy grey
7		market export of vehicles and huge losses in
8		terms of PST that is not being paid to the
9		benefit of society.
10	Q	And were there materials, Mr. LePard, that you
11		asked for from the province but that you weren't
12		able or weren't able to get?
13	А	Yes. For privacy reasons we wanted to know the
14		actual identities of who these straw buyers and
15		nominees were, who the people that were
16		exporting the vehicles, who the PST refunds were
17		going to because we were provided statistics
18		showing that we had the same nominee or straw
19		buyer involved over and over again in
20		buying these vehicles and we wanted to also know
21		who were the dealerships that were selling these
22		vehicles to them. Because while most of them
23		were probably duped and believed that this the
24		person was the actual purchaser and would honour
25		their commitment not to export it, we also

1	received information that there were dealers
2	that were possibly at least knew that this
3	was the reason this is what was going on,
4	which they would know if the same nominee straw
5	buyer was going back to the same dealership
6	repeatedly. We weren't able to get that
7	information to confirm that, but that was the
8	suspicion.
9	MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. LePard.
10	Mr. Commissioner, those are my questions.
11	I've received that note that estimates for
12	further examination of Mr. LePard are now just
13	under 30 minutes. If it works for you, I might
14	suggest a five-minute break before we get going
15	with those cross-examinations.
16	THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Mr. Davis, I think
17	that makes sense. Let's take five minutes now
18	and we'll resume with the examinations. Thank you.
19	MR. DAVIS: Thank you.
20	THE REGISTRAR: This hearing is adjourned for a five-
21	minute recess until 10:56 a.m. Please mute your
22	mic and turn off your video. Thank you.
23	(WITNESS STOOD DOWN)
24	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 10:51 A.M.)
25	(PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 10:55 A.M.)

1	DOUGLAS LEPARD, for the
2	commission, recalled.
3	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you for waiting. The hearing
4	is resumed. Mr. Commissioner.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Thank you, Madam Registrar.
6	Yes, I'll now call on Ms. Harlingten on
7	behalf of the province, who has been allocated
8	ten minutes.
9	MS. HARLINGTEN: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
10	EXAMINATION BY MS. HARLINGTEN:
11	Q Good morning, Mr. LePard. Can you hear me all
12	right?
13	A Yes, I can.
14	Q Thank you. Am I correct, Mr. LePard, that
15	there's currently seven GPEB members embedded
16	within JIGIT?
17	A The last that I heard, yes, there were seven.
18	Q And in your report and please just let me
19	know if you'd like me to bring it up. You make
20	the recommendation, I believe it's
21	recommendation number 12, that GPEB continue its
22	efforts to have its special provincial constable
23	investigators authorities enhanced to be in
24	better alignment with their responsibilities; is
25	that right?

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. Harlingten

1	A	Yes.
2	Q	And you made that recommendation because that
3		SPC status is currently I think you call it
4		narrow in your report?
5	А	They described it as narrow and that it had
6		interfered with their ability to be fully
7		integrated in the team, and that was described
8		to me by the Assistant Deputy Ministers as well
9		is that they were concerned that their
10		appointments were too narrow for them to be as
11		effective as they could be.
12	Q	And you sort of highlight that in your report, I
13		believe, beginning at one point at page 11 where
14		you note that the limited authorities of GPEB
15		investigators created challenges when integrated
16		into the original investigation team. And I
17		wondered if you could just expand on what you
18		mean by "challenges" for the Commissioner.
19	А	Right. Well, I mean, first of all, they were
20		integrated into the two investigative teams from
21		the beginning and they were essentially used
22		like the police officers as investigators. So
23		they were out doing, you know, enforcement
24		action in terms of surveillance of premises and
25		so on. And there were concerns that they're

1	peace officers but they re not police officers,
2	they are unarmed, they are not trained in the
3	use of force, for example, and so that created
4	search vulnerabilities and concerns for them.
5	And, you know, how much authority did they
6	have because their appointments under section 9
7	of the <i>Police Act</i> are very specific to their
8	duties which were originally envisioned as
9	regulation, not conducting police
10	investigations. So it seems like JIGIT, though,
11	came up with a good solution in terms of
12	focusing them in their intelligence unit where
13	they were developing the intelligence that could
14	then be actioned by the police officers. And if
15	that's going to continue, then and that model
16	works, then maybe nothing further is required.
17	But if they're going to be engaged in more
18	in-depth enforcement and investigation duties,
19	then I think it would be prudent to examine
20	whether the appointment is broad enough. And
21	especially if they are going to be put in a
22	position like they were in the first year of
23	engaging in actual enforcement actions yet are
24	unarmed and are not trained and authorized in
25	the use of force. That would be a concern.

peace officers but they're not police officers,

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. Harlingten

1	Q	Thank you, Mr. LePard. Just to sort of go back
2		to something that you said in your answer. So
3		when you're discussing the restructuring, am I
4		correct in understanding you're discussing the
5		2019 development into the intelligence unit?
6	A	Correct.
7	Q	And am I correct that that was to sort of move
8		those GPEB investigators over into that
9		intelligence unit to sort of leverage their
10		knowledge and experience better?
11	A	Exactly.
12	Q	In your review am I correct in understanding
13		that that at least to the extent that you
14		could evaluate at that time, that leveraging of
15		that knowledge and expertise was being sort of
16		effective for the JIGIT model?
17	A	Yeah, from JIGIT members and GPEB members, both
18		of them were in agreement that this was that
19		it was working very well. It was early days
20		when we were doing the review. It had happened
21		just recently, but they thought that it was
22		working very well and had great potential for
23		the future in terms of better analysis of the
24		information to convert it to intelligence that
25		could then be actioned.

1	Q	And am I correct sort of in understanding that
2		you developed that theme in your report, I
3		think, but then you go on to sort of note that
4		there might be a concern about the new model.
5		That there is going to be actionable
6		intelligence from that new unit, but there may
7		not be enough investigative resources to follow
8		through with it?
9	А	Right. Right. Well, the concern was that in
10		the original model there were two investigative
11		teams and one was for the longer term more
12		in-depth projects, investigations, and the other
13		one was what I will describe as quick hit
14		investigations. So, for example, an illegal
15		gaming house in a community that's causing
16		problems for that community and that
17		jurisdictional police force.
18		And so the concern was raised by actually
19		one of the police jurisdictions who is very
20		familiar with JIGIT and very complimentary of
21		their work, but it was concerned that that
22		capacity to do those quick hit investigations
23		that are of such value to a municipality would
24		be diminished. But the jury is out on that. We
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don't know.

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. Harlingten

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1	Q	Right. And just linked back to what we were
2		discuss ago moment ago, that enhanced SPC
3		status, would that be in your view one way of
4		working towards alleviating any concern about
5		quick hits or being able to do quick hits?
6	А	Well, it might be if the GPEB investigators
7		could be used with more versatility,
8		interchangeably that that would provide more
9		flexibility for the team. Like I say, they seem
10		to think that it was working quite well but also
11		were concerned that they simply didn't have the
12		capacity that they needed. One of the
13		investigators pointed out that they knew of
14		20 illegal gaming houses that they were unable
15		to get to.
16	Q	I think you touched on this with Mr. Davis but
17		just to sort of draw it out, in terms of having
18		subject matter experts embedded in a policing
19		unit, I take it from your report that having
20		people with particular knowledge and expertise
21		in certain areas, if JIGIT was to be expanded
22		would be a useful tool in your view?
23	А	Yes.
24	Q	All right. And just my last question touches on

something that you said to Mr. Davis in your

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. Harlingten

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1		evidence a moment ago about being unable to
2		access certain data from the province related to
3		PST sales tax. Did I understand your evidence
4		correctly that it was due to privacy concerns
5		was your understanding that you couldn't get
6		that data?
7	А	Yes. They were extremely helpful and
8		cooperative but explained that they had given us
9		as much as they could give us without revealing
10		personal identifying information that they were
11		bound not to do by FOIPPA.
12	Q	And were you aware at the time or are you aware
13		now, Mr. LePard, that there is a confidentiality
14		provision in the Provincial Sales Tax Act that
15		doesn't allow disclosure of certain information,
16		subject to some exceptions?
17	А	I wasn't aware of that specific feature, but I
18		understood and accepted that they were bound by
19		legislation not to provide that information to
20		us.
21	MS.	HARLINGTEN: Those are all of my questions.
22		Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
23	THE	COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you, Ms. Harlingten.
24		I'll now call on Ms. French on behalf of

Canada, who has been allocated five minutes.

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. French

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1 MS. FRENCH: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. 2 EXAMINATION BY MS. FRENCH: 3 0 Mr. LePard, can you hear me all right? 4 Α Yes, I can. Thank you. I just have a couple of questions 5 Q for you today. One is in reference to a 6 question from Mr. Davis earlier. 7 8 MS. FRENCH: So, Madam Registrar, could we please bring up the JIGIT review again. That's 9 exhibit 803. And I'm looking for PDF page 59, 10 11 please. Sorry, 107, if you don't mind. Quite 12 different. Thank you. 13 Mr. LePard, you were speaking with Mr. Davis Q 14 about Reports to Crown Counsel and JIGIT's 15 access to legal advice, and you mentioned that 16 if these reports are going to be of the highest 17 quality or if they're going to be as perfect as 18 they can be, then this legal assistance during 19 an investigation is important. Do you recall 20 that testimony? 21 Α Yes. 22 Q And I'm just looking at the finding here at the 23 top of this page. And I'll read it to you. 2.4 "Finding: Crown counsel assesses that

JIGIT investigations are of the highest

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. French

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1		quality."
2		And the second sentence in the paragraph below
3		reads:
4		"One prosecutor who handled several JIGIT
5		files described JIGIT's work as being of
6		the highest quality and exceptionally
7		thorough."
8		Have I read that correctly?
9	А	Yes.
10	Q	And so it's your understanding that JIGIT's work
11		and what was presented to Crown prosecutors has
12		been of the highest quality; correct?
13	А	Yes, based on the cases that that particular
14		Crown had reviewed, he was very complimentary of
15		their work.
16	MS.	FRENCH: Thank you. Madam Registrar, could we
17		please turn to PDF page 32, please. And I'm
18		looking here at recommendation 37, Mr. LePard.
19		You recommend that JIGIT seeks more
20		opportunities for communication and
21		collaboration with BCLC and gaming service
22		providers; is that correct?
23	А	Yes.
24	Q	You would agree with me that there will
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naturally be some limitations to the information

Α

1 that JIGIT can share with BCLC and service 2 providers? 3 Α Yes, absolutely. 4 Q And that there also might be a difference in the information that JIGIT is allowed to share with 5 BCLC versus what it can share with service 6 providers? 7 8 Α Yes. 9 MS. FRENCH: If we can scroll down a bit further, 10 please, Madam Registrar, so we can see 11 recommendation 42. Thank you. 12 0 Recommendation 42 -- I'll just read it -- says 13 that: 14 "When possible, all relevant information on the value of proceeds of crime assets 15 is recorded and tracked." 16 17 Have I read that correctly, Mr. LePard? 18 Α Yes. 19 And specifically you note further down in your Q 20 report that tracking non-liquid assets is 21 important. Do you recall that? 22 Α I believe so. 23 Can you explain what a non-liquid asset might 2.4 be?

Well, like for example, a vehicle. In one case

1		there was we weren't able to assess the total
2		value of a seizure in a case because we didn't
3		have information on the type of vehicles, the
4		year, the model and so on that might have
5		allowed us to assess that, and so we didn't have
6		that information. It was a fairly minor issue
7		and the recommendation was a fairly minor
8		recommendation, really. It was about
9		administrative housekeeping, tracking
10		information.
11	Q	And is it your understanding that generally
12		JIGIT does track non-liquid assets like
13		vehicles, phones, any property that is seized?
14	А	They certainly were tracking every item they
15		seized. Not necessarily assigning a value to
16		it, a dollar value to it, but they were
17		certainly tracking the items seized, whether it
18		was game equipment or vehicles or computers or
19		weapons.
20	Q	Thank you. And my last question here is about
21		recommend 43 which you've also discussed briefly
22		with Mr. Davis that high level gaming houses be
23		prioritized over low-level gaming houses. And
24		in discussing this point you referred to some
25		statistics, I believe, of the 30 files that were

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. French

1		opened and which ones had a nexus to organized
2		crime. Do you recall that testimony?
3	А	Yes.
4	Q	And you base that conclusion you said that
5		there was some challenging information or
6		contradictory information on this point and you
7		looked at the difference in numbers of the files
8		opened; is that right?
9	А	Yes.
10	Q	Are you aware, though, that JIGIT does
11		internally prioritize files that have a nexus to
12		organized crime and high-level illegal gaming
13		houses?
14	А	Yes. And in fairness, looking at it now, I
15		should have worded that recommendation that
16		high-level gaming houses continue to be
17		prioritized over low-level gaming houses. I
18		think they were attempting to do that and that
19		really was a recommendation for the future based
20		on the analysis showing the impact, the greater
21		impact of dealing with a larger volume illegal
22		gaming house and the interference with organized
23		crime and removing proceeds of crime from the
24		revenue stream and so on. So it really was
25		about them continuing to do what they were doing

1	but recognizing the greater impact of a
2	high-level house. But also making the point in
3	the report, not necessarily in the
4	recommendation, that there was value in doing
5	the lower level gaming houses too. That they
6	would have to assess them based on all the
7	information known to them, including the impact
8	on a community, a request from police of
9	jurisdiction.
10	So it's a difficult balancing act they have
11	to do and that was more of a general
12	recommendation just to draw their attention to
13	the fact of the greater impact at least in
14	reducing criminal revenue streams of focusing on
15	those that are associated to organized crime and
16	because that's what was set out in their
17	mandate.
18	MS. FRENCH: Thank you very much, Mr. LePard.
19	Mr. Commissioner those are all my questions.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. French.
21	I'll turn now to Mr. Leung on behalf of
22	BC Lottery Corporation, who has been allocated
23	five minutes.
24	MR. LEUNG: Thank you. We have no questions for this
0.5	

witness at this time.

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. Tweedie

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Yes.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Leung. 2 Mr. McFee on behalf of James Lightbody who 3 has been allocated ten minutes. 4 MR. McFEE: Well, the day is shortening Mr. Commissioner. Having heard Mr. LePard's 5 evidence, we have no questions for him. Thank 6 7 you. THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. McFee. Ms. Tweedie 8 on behalf of the BC Civil Liberties Association, 9 who has been allocated ten minutes. 10 11 MS. TWEEDIE: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. 12 EXAMINATION BY MS. TWEEDIE: 13 Good morning, Mr. LePard. Q 14 Good morning. Α So in your report you identify the Civil 15 Q 16 Forfeiture Office as a key tool for disruption 17 of illegal gaming activities, money laundering 18 and organized crime and you state that it's been 19 used extensively by JIGIT; is that correct? 20 Α Yes. 2.1 Q And you also state that it would be beneficial 22 to have a designated person whose sole 23 responsibility is civil forfeiture referrals; is 2.4 that correct?

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Ms. Tweedie

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A Correct.

1	Q	And in your report you state that it has been
2		argued that the best measure of success for
3		anti-money laundering is reduction in harms from
4		financial crime; correct?
5	А	Yes.
6	Q	And that a key variable that is often used as a
7		proxy indicator for harm reduction is the
8		criminal asset forfeiture rate; is that correct?
9	А	Yes.
10	Q	And that rate is meant to measure the proportion
11		of criminal funds intercepted compared to all
12		criminal funds available. Do I have that
13		correct?
14	А	Yes, you do.
15	Q	Okay. But of course you're aware that civil
16		forfeiture proceedings are initiated against the
17		profits of alleged criminal activity and that it
18		doesn't actually require a criminal charge or
19		conviction?
20	А	Yes. The targeting is at the property or the
21		cash, not the person.
22	Q	And that the province must only demonstrate on
23		the civil standard of a balance of probabilities
24		that the property is the proceeds of crime?

1	Q	So clearly having property seized through civil
2		forfeiture is not tantamount to proof that the
3		property is indeed proceeds of crime?
4	А	Sorry, can you give me that again.
5	Q	So clearly having property seized through civil
6		forfeiture is not tantamount to proof that that
7		property is the proceeds of crime?
8	А	No, I wouldn't agree with that. My
9		understanding is that it needs to be proved to
10		the standard of the civil standard of
11		probability.
12	Q	Okay. But just on that lower civil standard of
13		probability and it hasn't been proven in a court
14		of criminal jurisdiction to be the proceeds of
15		crime?
16	А	Correct. It doesn't meet the criminal standard
17		but it meets the civil standard.
18	Q	Okay. So to use the criminal asset forfeiture
19		rate as a measure of success, we're using funds
20		that have just met the balance of probability
21		standards and we're comparing it to a mere
22		estimation of all criminal funds; is that
23		correct?
24	А	Well, you're talking about money that has been

subject to civil forfeiture action. The formula

1		speaks to the amount of a seizure, the removal
2		of however it occurs, whether it's through a
3		criminal process, proceeds of crime or a civil
4		process, that the money is taken out of
5		circulation and is unavailable to invest back
6		into the criminal activities, then, yes, that's
7		what the formula is based on.
8	Q	Okay. So it's fair to say that this way to
9		measure impact involves estimation and it's
10		rather uncertain, as is the case with many money
11		laundering initiatives?
12	A	Yes, that's fair.
13	MS.	TWEEDIE: Okay. Madam Registrar, would we
14		actually be able to pull up the report, please,
15		exhibit 803, page 141.
16	Q	So I just have one question about this chart
17		here and this falls under the section of social
18		return on investment which you testified about
19		earlier. In the last category it states:
20		"Other potential unquantified impacts on
21		the police stakeholders and the public."
22		Do you see that there?
23	А	Yes.
24	Q	And I take it that potential is italicized here

to emphasize that we don't actually have a way

2.4

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Q

1 to measure or confirm these impacts? 2 Well, they are potential impacts in that they Α 3 may not occur in every case but some of them are 4 actual impacts. It was just a way of 5 recognizing that the value that is set out there, the \$4.271 million, is not the only 6 value. 7 8 For example, I gave in my evidence in terms of the benefits to a community and assistance to 9 10 a local police force that that has real value. 11 And so in those cases where they are able to 12 provide support in addressing a community 13 problem which may be generating concerns in the 14 community, that's a real impact. What the value 15 of that is, that is difficult to assess but 16 there is some value, but it's certainly it goes 17 beyond potential when the value actually occurs 18 when the assistance is provided to a community, 19 for example, or to a local police force. 20 Okay. But to confirm, the values listed here Q 2.1 are ones that have not been measured in a 22 quantifiable way? 23 Α No.

Okay. Can we please turn to page 17 of the PDF.

So under the heading again on the "The Social

1		Return on Investment," I just have one question.
2		The second paragraph there, the second sentence
3		states:
4		"Additionally money laundering often
5		contributes to some of the most serious
6		and violent criminal activities, including
7		drug trafficking and gang-related violent
8		crime."
9		Would you agree that it's in fact drug
10		trafficking that fuels money laundering in the
11		first place as it's these profits that need to
12		be laundered?
13	А	Well, it's symbiotic. I mean, drug trafficking
14		occurs and it creates profits that need to be
15		laundered, and then the laundering puts more
16		money into the criminal stream and is
17		re-invested in crime. I mean, that's what a lot
18		of money laundering is. You know, you can have
19		trade-based money laundering, which you can
20		have I spoke about before where you can have
21		vehicles that are either fraudulently obtained,
22		stolen or purchased that are being used to
23		purchase drugs which are going into the
24		community and the profits from those are used to
25		purchase more vehicles which are sent, exported

1	to countries like Ghana and Nigeria and Asia and
2	so on as part of major drug and money laundering
3	conspiracies, and those have been very well
4	documented. So it's symbiotic and a little bit
5	of chicken and egg.
6	MS. TWEEDIE: Thank you. Madam Registrar, I don't
7	need that document anymore.
8	Q And just one final question. You spoke about
9	enhanced police powers in the context of special
10	provincial constables. I assume you would agree
11	generally that any enhanced police powers must
12	of course conform to any limits of the Charter
13	of Rights and Freedoms; is that correct?
14	A Of course. And the same with, you know,
15	activities related to CFO referrals obviously
16	have to conform to the legislation and that's
17	why we have an independent judiciary which
18	doesn't always agree with the CFO, for example.
19	MS. TWEEDIE: Thank you. Those are my questions.
20	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
21	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Tweedie.
22	And now I'll call on Mr. Rauch-Davis for
23	Transparency International Coalition, and he has
24	been allocated ten minutes.

MR. RAUCH-DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

25

1 EXAMINATION BY MR. RAUCH-DAVIS:

- 2 Q Mr. LePard, can you hear me okay?
- 3 A Yes, I can.
- 4 Q Okay. Great. I just have a few general
- 5 questions about some of the comments raised in
- 6 your evidence this morning. The first I have a
- 7 note when you were discussing the effectiveness
- 8 of Canada's money laundering regime or
- 9 anti-money laundering money laundering regime,
- in looking at some of the kind of low numbers of
- 11 charges and prosecutions I believe your evidence
- was that Canada doesn't have the necessary tools
- 13 compared to other successful jurisdictions. And
- 14 so I'm wondering if you could elaborate on what
- tools are you referencing in that statement?
- A Well, for example, the FATF has pointed out that
- 17 the -- you know, the law enforcement resources
- 18 devoted to this issue are insufficient and also
- 19 points out that the sentences aren't sufficient
- to deter the activity as well. So, you know,
- 21 the very fact that we have seen so many -- so
- few successful money laundering prosecutions in
- Canada compared to other jurisdictions I think
- speaks for itself.
- 25 Q Right. And so I take it when you gave that

1		evidence, you were referencing kind of the FATF
2		reports and some of these second sources that
3		you had consulted in your work?
4	А	Yes.
5	Q	Okay. And so I guess in the same vein your
6		evidence this morning was also along the lines
7		of it's better to look upstream from the
8		policing units in terms of how to respond to
9		the to combatting money laundering. I take
10		it you'd agree, though, that the best deterrent
11		is going to be successful prosecutions with
12		seizure; right?
13	А	I think that that is an important deterrent,
14		absolutely.
15	Q	Right. And pardon me, I didn't mean to
16	А	It doesn't necessarily have to be a criminal
17		prosecution. Like I say, seizing wealth from
18		criminals has shown to be a very effective
19		technique. And so if you take the profit out of
20		crime and especially if you can return that
21		profit to actually good social purposes, that's
22		a powerful tool as well. But I do agree that if
23		you have successful investigations but, you
24		know, what we know from, you know, the deterrent
25		impact of policing on crime is that there has to

1		be some certainty of being caught. And that
2		then the consequences are sufficient to deter
3		the activity in the future both in a specific
4		way with that offender, which might include
5		incapacitating them and in, you know, a way a
6		general way, a general deterrence with other
7		offenders who see the cost as being too high.
8		If the cost is just seen as if the cost is
9		seen low because the certainty of apprehension
10		is low, then there's not going to be much
11		deterrent value.
12	Q	Right. We have to avoid kind of the cost of
13		doing business where the penalties are too low,
14		money launderers are just like, I can eat the
15		penalty and still make a large profit. That's
16		what your evidence is?
17	A	Exactly.
18	Q	Yeah. And I think you mentioned the UK as a
19		successful jurisdiction, right, in combatting
20		money laundering?
21	A	According to the FATF they are successful and
22		have a strong AML regime and that one of the
23		pieces of evidence showing that is the number of
24		criminal cases that they have a year and the
25		number of successful prosecutions that they have

1		a year, which is just in a different world than
2		what is going on in Canada.
3	Q	Do you think part of the difference between
4		these two jurisdictions is the ability to detect
5		money laundering?
6	А	Yes, absolutely. When I speak about the tools
7		involved, I mean, there does seem to be so much
8		uncertainty. I know that the most recent report
9		from the province estimated that in 2018 that
10		the amount of money laundered in BC was about
11		7.5 billion, but there are estimates that range
12		all over the place from the FATF, RCMP, that
13		report, you know, based on different models. If
14		you don't have the tools in place to detect and
15		assess what's going on, then no one is really
16		going to have the answer.
17		And so that is why and I hope made clear
18		in my evidence that what I really support is
19		looking at the police as the last line of
20		defence and doing as much as possible to defect
21		and interfere and prevent money laundering
22		upstream and just leaving those cases for which
23		there's no other reasonable solution but a
24		police investigation for the police to deal
25		with. But, you know, the literature suggests,

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Mr. Rauch-Davis

1	including your report, you know, that there
2	needs to be cooperation between governments and
3	businesses and regulators in preventing money
4	laundering or making it more difficult to occur
5	in the first place.
6	MR. RAUCH-DAVIS: Thank you. I appreciate the
7	clarification there. Those are my questions.
8	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Rauch-Davis.
9	Anything arising, Ms. Tweedie?
10	MS. TWEEDIE: Nothing arising. Thank you.
11	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Ms. French?
12	MS. FRENCH: Nothing arising. Thank you.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Ms. Harlingten?
14	MS. HARLINGTEN: No, Mr. Commissioner. Thank you.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Davis?
16	MR. DAVIS: Nothing, Mr. Commissioner.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, very much, Mr. LePard.
18	I very much appreciate the time you've taken to
19	share your experience and insights with us and
20	to cast some light on some issues that the
21	commission will be grappling with in its final
22	report. So I am grateful to you for your
23	testimony. You are now excused from further
24	evidence. And I think, Mr. Davis, we need to
25	stand down for about 15 minutes to get the next

Douglas LePard (for the commission) Exam by Mr. Rauch-Davis

1	panel on board. That's my understanding. So
2	we'll take a 15-minute break.
3	MR. DAVIS: That's correct. Mr. Commissioner, if I
4	could just advise as well that a separate Zoom
5	link will be sent to participants for the
6	afternoon session. If participants don't have
7	one, they can contact me or one of the staff
8	directly and we'll get that over to them. Thank
9	you.
10	THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you.
11	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
12	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now adjourned for a
13	15-minute recess until 11:42 a.m. Please mute
14	your mic and turn off your video.
15	(WITNESS EXCUSED)
16	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:27 A.M.)
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